Kevin Walker, sui juris, In Propria Persona C/o 30650 Rancho California Road #406-251 Temecula, California [92591] non-domestic without the United States Email: team@walkernovagroup.com

Plaintiff, Real Party In Interest, Injured Party TMKEVIN WALKER©



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, EASTERN DIVISION

Kevin Walker, sui juris Plaintiff/Real Party in Interest/Injured Party

US.

Chad Bianco, 12

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Steven Arthur Sherman,

Gregory D Eastwood, 13

Robert C V Bowman,

George Reves, 14

William Pratt,

15 Robert Gell,

Nicholas Gruwell,

16 Joseph Sinz,

Michael Hestrin, 17

Miranda Thomson,

RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

19 CALIFORNIA,

MENIFEE JUSTICE CENTER, 20

FERGUSON PRAET & SHERMAN A

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, Does 1-100 Inclusive,

22 Defendant(s).

23 24

25

26

27

28

21

18

COMES NOW, Plaintiff TMKevin Walker (hereinafter "Plaintiff" and/or "Real

Party in Interest"), who is proceeding sui juris, In Propria Persona, and by Special

Limited Appearance (NOT generally).

TO THE HONORABLE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES:

Page 1 of 8

Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA

NOTICE OF FILING FIRST AMENDED <u>VERIFIED</u> COMPLAINT AS A MATTER OF COURSE

1

6

7

10

11

12

13

28

- Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), Plaintiff hereby files this First
- Amended Verified Complaint, which supersedes the original complaint filed in
- 4 this matter.
- 5 As of the date of this filing:
 - No Defendant has filed a responsive pleading or motion under Rule 12; and
 - Plaintiff is therefore entitled to amend as a matter of course without leave of Court.
 - This amended complaint removes all references to previously named trust or estate entities and proceeds solely in the name of **Kevin Walker**, who is proceeding *sui juris*, *In Propria Persona*, and by *Special Limited Appearance* (NOT generally), in his individual capacity as *Real Party in Interest*, and **Secured Party**.

LIST OF EXHIBITS / EVIDENCE:

- 14 1. Exhibit A: Affidavit: Power of Attorney In Fact'
- 15 2.Exhibit B: Hold Harmless Agreement
- 16 3. Exhibit C: Private UCC Contract Trust/UCC1 filing #2024385925-4.
- 17 4. Exhibit D: Private UCC Contract Trust/UCC3 filing ##2024402990-2.
- 18 5. E Exhibit E: Contract Security Agreement #RF775820621US, titled: NOTICE OF
- 19 CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE, and FRAUD, RACKETEERING,
- 20 CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW,
- 21 IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION, COERCION, TREASON.
- 22 6. Exhibit F: Contract Security Agreement #RF775821088US, titled: NOTICE OF
- DEFAULT, and FRAUD, RACKETEERING, CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF
- 24 RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW, IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION,
- 25 COERCION, TREASON
- 26 7. Exhibit G: Contract Security Agreement #RF775822582US, titled: NOTICE OF
- 27 DEFAULT AND OPPORTUNITY TO CURE <u>AND</u> NOTICE OF FRAUD,
 - RACKETEERING, CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE

Page 2 of 8

- COLOR OF LAW, IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION, COERCION, KIDNAPPING.
- 8. Exhibit H: Contract Security Agreement #RF775823645US, titled: Affidavit
 Certificate of Dishonor, Non-response, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and LIEN
 AUTHORIZATION.
 - 9. **Exhibit I**: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit E.

1

- 7 \parallel 10. **Exhibit** J: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit F.
- 8 11. Exhibit K: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit G.
- 9 | 12. Exhibit L: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit H.
- 10 13. Exhibit M: INVOICE/TRUE BILL #RIVSHERTREAS12312024
- 11 | 14. Exhibit N: Copy of 'MASTER DISCHARGE AND INDEMNITY BOND' #RF661448567US.
- 13 15. Exhibit O: Photograph(s) of Defendant/Respondent Gregory D Eastwood.
- 14 16. Exhibit P: Photograph(s) of Defendant/Respondent Robert C V Bowman.
- 15 17. Exhibit Q: Photograph(s) of Defendant/Respondent Willam Pratt.
- 18. Exhibit R: Affidavit 'Right to Travel': CANCELLATION, TERMINATION, AND
 REVOCATION of COMMERCIAL "For Hire" DRIVER'S LICENSE CONTRACT
- and AGREEMENT. LICENSE/BOND # B6735991
- 19 19. **Exhibit S:** Revocation Termination and Cancelation of Franchise.
- 20 **Exhibit T:** CITATION/BOND #TE464702, accepted **under threat**, **duress**, **and** coercion.
- 22 21. Exhibit U: Private Transport's PRIVATE PLATE displayed on the automobile
- 22. Exhibit V: Copy of "Automobile" and "commercial vehicle" defined by DMV
 (Department of Motor Vehicles).
- 25 23. Exhibit W: Copy of CA CODE § 260 from https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov.
- 26 24. Exhibit X: national/non-citizen national passport card #C35510079.
- 27 25. Exhibit Y: national/non-citizen national passport book #A39235161.
- 28 26.Exhibit Z: TMKEVIN LEWIS WALKER© Copyright and Trademark Agreement.

 Page 3 of 8

Page 4 of 8

NOTICE OF FILING FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT AS A MATTER OF COURSE

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)

ss.

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE)

I competent, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My mailing address is the Delfond Group, care of: 30650 Rancho California Road suite 406-251, Temecula, California [92591]. On or before **April 17**, **2025**, I served the within documents:

1. [AMENDED] <u>VERIFIED</u> COMPLAINT FOR FRAUD, BREACH OF CONTRACT, THEFT, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW, CONSPIRACY, RACKETEERING, KIDNAPPING, TORTURE, and SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

2. Exhibits A through BB.

3. NOTICE OF FILING FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT AS A MATTER OF COURSE

By United States Mail. I enclosed the documents in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the persons at the addresses listed below by placing the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepared. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The envelope or package was placed in the mail in Riverside County, California, and sent via Registered Mail with a form 3811.

Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, Robert Gell, Joseph Sinz, Nicholas Gruwell, C/o RIVERSIDE SHERIFF 30755-D Auld Road, Suite L-067 Murrieta, California [92563]

Page 5 of 8

jsinz@riversidesheriff.org wpratt@riversidesheriff.org

Page 6 of 8

Page 7 of 8

NOTICE OF FILING FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT AS A MATTER OF COURSE

28

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California

Case	5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA Document 15 Filed 04/21/25 Page 8 of 63 Page ID #:647
	Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA — Registered Mail #RF775824950US — Dated: April 17, 2025
1	that the above is true and correct. Executed on April 17, 2025 in Riverside County,
2	California.
3	/s/Corey Walker/ Corey Walker
4	//
5	NOTICE:
6	Using a notary on this document does <i>not</i> constitute any adhesion, <i>nor does it alter</i>
7	my status in any manner. The purpose for notary is verification and identification
8	only and not for entrance into any foreign jurisdiction.
9	ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:
10	State of California) A notary public or other officer completing this certificate
11	verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.
12	County of Riverside)
13	On this <u>17th</u> day of <u>April</u> , <u>2025</u> , before me, <u>Joyti Patel</u> , a Notary Public, personally
14	appeared Kevin Walker, who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to
15	be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and
16	acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their
17	authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument
18	the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the
19	instrument.
20	I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California
21	that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.
22	
23	WITNESS my hand and official seal.
24	Notary Public - California Riverside County Commission # 2407742
25	My Comm. Expires Jul 8, 2026
26	Signature Jaytuatu (Seal)
27	
28	
	Page 8 of 8 NOTICE OF FILING FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT AS A MATTER OF COURSE
	TO HOL OF THE PROTECTION AND ADDRESS OF THE PROTECTION OF COORSE

Limited Appearance (NOT generally). Kevin is natural freeborn sovereign and state Citizen of California the republic in its De'jure capacity as one of the several states of the Union 1789. This incidentally makes him a non-citizen national/national American Citizen of the republic as per the De'Jure Constitution for the United States 1777/1789. Plaintiff, appearing by Special Limited Appearance, sui juris, and In Propria Persona, asserts his unalienable right to contract, as secured by Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, which states: "No State shall... pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts," and thus which prohibits states from impairing the obligation of contracts. 10 11 This clause unequivocally prohibits states from impairing the obligation of contracts, including but not limited to, a trust and contract agreement as an 12 'Attorney-In-Fact,' and any private contract existing between Plaintiff and 13 Defendants. A copy of the 'Affidavit: Power of Attorney In Fact,' is attached hereto as **Exhibits A** and incorporated herein by reference. Plaintiff further invokes his inherent unalienable rights under the Constitution and 16 the common law-rights that predate the formation of the tatse and remain 17

Constitutional Basis:

Plaintiff asserts that their **private rights** are secured *and* protected under the **Constitution**, **common law**, and **exclusive equity**, which govern their ability to freely contract and protect their property and interests..

Plaintiff respectfully asserts and affirms:

safeguarded by due process of law.

18

19

20

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

"The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is <u>unlimited</u>. He owes no such duty [to submit his books and papers for an examination] to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the

law of the land [Common Law] long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights." (*Hale v. Henkel*, 201 U.S. 43, 47 [1905]).

- "The claim and exercise of a constitutional **right cannot** be converted into a crime."—Miller v. U.S., 230 F 2d 486, 489.
- "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
- "There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this
 exercise of constitutional rights." —Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 945.
- "A law repugnant to the Constitution is void." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
 (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
- "It is not the duty of the citizen to surrender his rights, liberties, and immunities under the guise of police power or any other governmental power." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966).
- "An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
- "No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law, and no courts are bound to enforce it." 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 177, Late Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 256.
- "Sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

Supremacy Clause:

Plaintiff respectfully asserts and affirms that:

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States (Article VI, Clause 2) establishes that the Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to it, and treaties made under its authority, constitute the "supreme Law of the Land", and thus take priority over any conflicting state laws. It provides that state courts are bound by, and state constitutions subordinate to, the supreme law. However, federal statutes and treaties must be within the parameters of the Constitution; that is, they must be pursuant to the federal government's enumerated powers, and not violate other constitutional limits on federal power ... As a constitutional provision identifying the supremacy of federal law, the Supremacy Clause assumes the underlying priority of federal authority, albeit only when that authority is expressed in the Constitution itself; no matter what the federal or state governments might wish to do, they must stay within the boundaries of the Constitution.

Plaintiff sues Defendant(s) and assert as **established**, *considered*, *agreed* and *admitted* by Defendants:

- 1. Plaintiff, Kevin Walker, proceeding, *sui juris*, In Propria Person, by Special Limited Appearance, is undisputedly the **holder in due course**' of <u>all</u> assets, intangible and tangible, hold allodial title to all assets, in accordance with UCC § 3-302, and security interest and title has been perfected.
- **2.** Plaintiff is **foreign** to the 'United States', which is a federal corporation, as evidenced by 28 U.S. Code § 3002.
 - **3.** Plaintiff is <u>undisputedly</u> the Creditor.
- **4.** Plaintiff has explicitly reserved <u>all</u> of his inherent unalienable rights, also in accordance with U.C.C. § 1-308, and have waives <u>none</u>.

1	5. Plaintiff alone <i>undisputedly</i> has exclusive, sole, and complete standing.
2	Defendants

11

14

15

16

17

18

19

23

- 6. Defendant(s), Chad Bianco, Steven Arthur Sherman,
- Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, Robert Gell,
- 5 Nicholas Gruwell, Joseph Sinz, Michael Hestrin, Miranda Thomson, RIVERSIDE
- 6 COUNTY SHERIFF, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, MENIFEE
- 7 || JUSTICE CENTER, FERGUSON PRAET & SHERMAN A PROFESSIONAL
- 8 CORPORATION, Does 1-100 Inclusive, Does 1-100 Inclusive, according to Law and Statute,
- 9 are each a 'person,' and/or 'trust' and/or 'individual,' and/or 'bank' as defined by 26
- 10 U.S. Code § 7701(a)(1), U.C.C. §§ 1-201 and 4-105, 26 U.S. Code § 581, and 12 U.S. Code §
 - 221a, and/or a 'financial institution,' as defined by 18 U.S. Code § 20 Financial institution
- defined, and Defendants are engaged in interstate commerce, and/or doing business in
- 13 Riverside, California.
 - 7. Defendants are **undisputedly** the **DEBTORS** in this matter.
 - **8.** Defendants are **undisputedly NOT** the CREDITOR(S), or an ASSIGNEE(S) of the CREDITOR(S), in this matter.
 - 9. Defendants do **NOT** have power of attorney in any way.
 - 10. Defendants do **NOT** have **any** standing.
 - 11. Defendants are presumed to be in dishonor, in accordance with U.C.C. §
- 20 3-505, as evidenced by the attached 'Affidavit Certificate of Dishonor, Non-
- 21 response, **DEFAULT**, JUDGEMENT, and **LIEN AUTHORIZATION**'. A copy is
- 22 attached hereto as **Exhibit H** and incorporated herein by reference.

Unknown Defendants (Does 1-100)

- 24 | 12. Plaintiff does not know the true names of Defendants Does 1 through 100,
- 25 inclusive, and therefore sues them by those fictitious names. Their true names and
- 26 capacities are unknown to Plaintiff. When their true names and capacities are ascertained,
- 27 | Plaintiff will amend this complaint by inserting their true names and capacities herein.
 - Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of these unknown and

5

6

7

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

19

20

21

26

27

fictitiously named Defendant(s) claim some right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the hereinafter-described real property adverse to Plaintiff's title, and that their claims, and each of them, constitute a cloud on Plaintiff's title to that real property.

Description of Affected Private Trust Property:

13. This action affects title to the private Trust property (herein referred to as "private property" and/or "subject property"), a Lamborghini Urus, VIN #ZPBUA1ZL9KLA02762, including all ownership, title, interest, and authority over said private property, as well as all bonds, securities, Federal Reserve Notes, assets, both tangible and intangible, registered and unregistered, and all assets held in trust, as more particularly described in the authentic UCC1 filing and NOTICE #2024385925-4 and UCC3 filing and NOTICE #2024402990-2, all filed in the Office of the Secretary of State, State of Nevada, and attached hereto as Exhibits C and D, respectively, and incorporated herein by reference.

14. This action also affected any titles, investments, interests, principal amounts, credits, funds, assets, bonds, Federal Reserve Notes, notes, bills of exchange, entitlements, negotiable instruments, or similar collateralized, hypothecated, and/ or securitized items in any manner tied to Plaintiff's signature, promise to pay, order to pay, endorsement, credits, authorization, or comparable actions (collectively referred to hereinafter as "Assets").

Standing:

15. Plaintiff is undisputedly the Real Party in Interest, holder in due course, Creditor(s), and hold allodial tittle to any and all assets, registered or unregistered, tangible or intangible, in accordance with contract law, principles, common law, exlcusive equity, the right to equitable subrogation, and the UCC (Uniform Commercial Code). This is further evidenced by the following UCC filings, all duly filed in the Office of the Secretary of State, State of Nevada: UCC1 filing NOTICE #2024385925-4 and UCC3 filing and NOTICE #2024402990-2 (Exhibits C and D), and in accordance with UCC §§ 3-302, 9-105, and 9-509.

5

7

8

10

12

11

13 14

15

1617

18

20

21

2223

2425

26

27

28

16. While this action arises out of private trust contracts and fiduciary injuries, the sole Plaintiff is Kevin Walker, *sui juris*, individually and not as trustee or agent for any other party

- 17. Although this matter involves **trust property** and **contractual claims** related to **private trust arrangements**, this action is brought solely by Kevin Walker, proceeding *sui juris*, *In Propria Persona*, as the **Real Party in Interest** and Secured Party Creditor. No party other than Kevin Walker is named as plaintiff herein.
- 18.Plaintiff maintains **exclusive and sole standing** in relation to said assets and their interests, as duly recorded and affirmed by these filing.
 - 19. Plaintiff (not Defendants) possesses exclusive equity.
 - 20. Defendants do **NOT** have any valid interest or standing.
- 21. Defendants do <u>NOT</u> have a valid claim to Plaintiff's 'private property', or 'subject property', or any of the respective 'Assets', registered *and* unregistered, tangible *and* intangible.

Unrebutted Facts and Presumptions Established

- 22. You, as the Defendant(s) and/or Respondent(s), individually and collectively, are deemed to have accepted and agreed to the following established facts, all of which remain unrebutted and stand as truth in commerce, law, and equity:
 - 1. I, Kevin, proceeding sui juris, reserve my natural common law right not to be compelled to perform under any contract that I did not enter into knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally, and with complete and full disclosure, and without misrepresentation, duress, or coercion. And furthermore, I do not accept the liability associated with the compelled and pretended "benefit" of any hidden or unrevealed contract or commercial agreement. As such, the hidden or unrevealed contracts that supposedly create obligations to perform, for persons of subject status, are inapplicable to me, and are null and void. If I have participated in any of the supposed

2

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- "benefits" associated with these hidden contracts, I have done so under duress, for lack of any other practical alternative. I may have received such "benefits" but I have not accepted them in a manner that binds me to anything.
- 2. I, Kevin, proceeding sui juris, by Special Limited Appearance, hereby declare and affirm that, consistent with the eternal tradition of natural common law, unless I have harmed or violated someone or their property, I have **committed no crime**; and I am therefore <u>not</u> subject to any penalty. I act in accordance with the following <u>U.S. Supreme Court case:</u> "The individual may stand upon his **constitutional rights** as a <u>c</u>itizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no such duty [to submit his books and papers for an examination] to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land [Common Law] long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 at 47 (1905).
- 3. I, Kevin, proceeding sui juris, by Special Limited Appearance, herby assert, affirm, state, and verify for the record that the 'commercial' and 'for hire' Driver's License/Contract/Bond # B6735991 has been canceled, revoked, terminated, and liquidated, as evidenced by instructions and notice accepted by Steven Gordon, with the California Department of Motor Vehicles," as evidenced by AFFIDAVIT RIGHT TO TRAVEL CANCELLATION, TERMINATION, AND REVOCATION of COMMERCIAL "For Hire" DRIVER'S LICENSE CONTRACT and AGREEMENT LICENSE/BOND

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA — Registered Mail #RF775824950US — Dated: April 17, 2025

#B6735991 (#RF661447751US), attached hereto as Exhibit D and incorporated herein by reference.

- 4. I, Kevin: Walker, sui juris, am not a "person" when such term is defined in statutes of the United States or statutes of the several states when such definition includes artificial entities. I refuse to be treated as a federally or state created entity which is only capable of exercising certain rights, privileges, or immunities as specifically granted by federal or state governments.
- 5. I voluntarily choose to comply with the man-made laws which serve to bring harmony to society, but no such laws, nor their enforcers, have any authority over me. I am not in any jurisdiction, for I am not of subject status.
- 6. Consistent with the **eternal tradition of natural common law**, unless I have harmed or violated someone or their property, I have committed no crime; and am therefore not subject to any penalty.
- 7. I, Kevin, sui juris, proceeding sui juris, hereby declare and re-affirm that, no valid contract exists compelling my performance by Defendants.
- 8. I, Kevin, sui juris, reserve my natural common law right not to be compelled to perform under any contract that I did not enter into knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally. And furthermore, I do not accept the liability associated with the compelled and pretended "benefit" of any hidden or unrevealed contract or commercial agreement.
- 9. As such, any hidden or unrevealed contracts that supposedly create obligations to perform, for persons of subject status, are inapplicable to me, and are null and void. If I have participated in any of the supposed "benefits" associated with these hidden contracts, I have done so under **duress** and/or for lack of any other practical alternative. I may have received such "benefits" but I have not accepted them in a manner that binds me to anything.

- 10. Any such participation does not constitute "acceptance" in contract law, because of the absence of <u>full disclosure</u> of any valid "OFFER," and voluntary consent *without* misrepresentation or coercion, under contract law. Without a valid voluntary 'offer and acceptance', knowingly entered into by both parties, there is no "meeting of the minds," and therefore no valid contract. Any supposed "contract" is therefore void, *ab initio*
- 11. I, Kevin, *proceeding sui juris*, **state for the record**, that it is a long-standing legal principle that jurisdiction must be proven on the record and cannot be assumed.
- 12. I, Kevin, *proceeding sui juris*, hereby declare and affirm that, I do no consent to any of the **retaliatory** and **fraudulent** proceedings being conducts by Defendants, including but not limited to, the fraudulent Trust action/CASE NO.: SWM2303376.
- 13. I, Kevin, *proceeding sui juris*, affirm that, I have NOT injured any man or woman nor have I damaged any property.

Revocation of 'Power of Attorney':

- 14. Furthermore, I, Kevin, proceeding sui juris, by Special Limited Appearance, hereby revoke, rescind, and make void ab initio, all powers of attorney, in fact or otherwise, implied in law or otherwise, signed either by me or anyone else, as it pertains to the Social Security Number assigned to, WALKER, KEVIN LEWIS, as it pertains to any BIRTH CERTIFICATE/BANK NOTE, BOND, TRUST, DEPOSIT ACCOUNT, SECURITY, SECURITY ACCOUNT, INVESTMENT, marriage or business licenses, or any other licenses or certificates issued by any and all government or quasi-governmental entities, due to the use of various elements of fraud by said agencies to attempt to deprive me of my Sovereignty and/or property.
- 15. I, Kevin, *proceeding sui juris*, by *Special Limited Appearance*, hereby waive, cancel, repudiate, and refuse to knowingly accept any alleged "benefit" or

gratuity associated with any of the aforementioned licenses, numbers, or certificates. I do hereby revoke and rescind all powers of attorney, in fact or otherwise, signed by me or otherwise, implied in law or otherwise, with or without my consent or knowledge, as it pertains to any and all property, real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal, obtained in the past, present, or future. I am the sole and absolute legal owner and possess *allodial* title to any and all such property.

16. I, Kevin, *proceeding sui juris*, by *Special Limited Appearance*, also revoke,

16. I, Kevin, proceeding sui juris, by Special Limited Appearance, also revoke, cancel, and make void ab initio all powers of attorney, in fact, in presumption, or otherwise, signed either by me or anyone else, claiming to act on my behalf, with or without my consent, as such power of attorney pertains to me or any property owned by me, by, but not limited to, any and all quasi/colorable, public, governmental entities or corporations on the grounds of constructive fraud, concealment, and nondisclosure of pertinent facts.

Claim of Entire ESTATE:

- 17. I, Kevin, proceeding sui juris, by Special Limited Appearance, having attained the age of majority and reason under divine law competent first-hand witness to the truth and facts recited herein, hereby makes a claim against the corpus, all property whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, all deposit accounts blocked by reason of presumption of death of Claimant, cash, credit lines, Credit default swap, all federal funds, collateralized debt obligation, options, derivates, and futures received by the said court in the said county, state and federal for the administration of the named estate, and all estates in agency, including but not limited to KEVIN LEWIS WALKER, or by whatsoever name the said ESTATE shall be called or charged.
- 18. ACTUAL CONSTRUCTIVE NOTIVE HAS BEEN GIVEN *and* THIS IS AGAIN ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE BY SPECIAL

DEPOSIT FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE SECURED PARTY/GRANTEE BENEFICIARY/CLAIMANT IN THIS TRUST ACTION FOR THE 2 CLAIMANT'S CLAIM: Notice of absolute claim of all investment, 3 commodity and trust deposit account contract with attached collateral and proceeds to secure collateral, along with claim of TRADENAME/ TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT/PATENT of the Name KEVIN LEWIS 6 WALKER, my mind, body, soul of infants, spirit, and Live Borne Record, and reject and rebuke all assumptions and presumptions of being Property of any Cestui Que Vie Trust/ESTATE as mentioned under CANON 2055-2056, and assignment of all debt obligations to the 10 Office of Secretary of the Treasury. Discharge all tax matters in 11 accordance with but not limited to, U.C.C. 1-103, 2-202, 2-204, 2-206, 12 3-104, 3-311, 3-601, 3-603, 9-104, 9-105, 9-150, 9-509, and House Joint 13 Resolution 192 of June 5 1933, public law 73-10, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 3123, 14 5118, and 18 U.S.C. 8. 15

- 19. Defendants, are undisputedly the <u>DEBTORS</u> in this matter.
- 20. Defendants are **undisputedly NOT** the CREDITOR(S), or an ASSIGNEE(S) of the CREDITOR(S), in this matter.
- 21. Defendants do <u>NOT</u> have power of attorney in any way.
- 22. Defendants do **NOT** have **any** standing

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23. The actions of Defendant undermine the fundamental **principles** of fairness and justice enshrined in the Constitution, denying Plaintiffs and/or Affiant the opportunity to be heard and to defend against the allegations. These due process violations not only infringe upon constitutional protections but also **erode public trust in the judicial system**
- 24. Defendants actions violate various U.S. Code sections including but not limited to the following:

-12 of 116-

- 25. **42** U.S.C. § 1983 which provides a civil remedy for individuals deprived of constitutional rights under the color of law. The lack of notice and due process constitutes a clear deprivation of rights under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
- 26. **18 U.S.C. § 241** which criminalizes conspiracies to deprive individuals of their constitutional rights. Any coordinated effort or negligence leading to this denial of due process is punishable under this statute.
- 27.18 U.S.C. § 242 which prohibits willful deprivation of constitutional rights under the color of law. By advancing legal proceedings without proper notice, Defendants have knowingly violated this protection.
- 28. All Affidavits Notices and Self-Executing Contract and Security Agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H) are *prima facie* evidence of fraud, racketeering, indentity theft, treason, breach of trust and fiduciary duties, extortion, coercion, deprivation of rights under the color of law, conspiracy to deprive of rights under the color of law, monopolization of trade and commerce, forced peonage, obstruction of enforcement, extortion of a national/internationally protected person, false imprisonment, torture, creating trusts in restraint of trade dereliction of fiduciary duties, bank fraud, breach of trust, treason, tax evasion, bad faith actions, dishonor, injury and damage to Affiant and proof of claim. See *United States v. Kis*, 658 F.2d, 526 (7th Cir. 1981)., "Appellee had the burden of first proving its prima facie case and could do so by affidavit or other evidence."

UNLAWFUL ARREST, IMPRISONMENT, AND TORTURE

29. On **December 31, 2024**, at approximately 9:32am I, **Kevin: Walker**, *sui juris*, was **traveling privately** in a **private** conveyance/automobile, displaying a '**PRIVATE'** plate, indicating I was 'not for hire' or operating commercially, and the private automobile was not displaying a STATE plate of any sort.

This clearly established that the <u>private</u> automobile was 'not for hire' or 'commercial' use and, therefore explicitly classifying the automobile as <u>private property</u>, and <u>NOT</u> within any statutory and/or commercial jurisdiction.

- 30. On **December 31, 2024**, I, Kevin: Walker, *sui juris*, was **not** in violation of any law, nor was I speeding, infringing, or trespassing upon the rights of any man or woman. I was peacefully minding my own business and traveling to obtain groceries for my family.
- 31. I, Kevin: Walker, *sui juris*, simply wish to be left alone in peace and **not** be harassed, stalked, robbed, deprived under color of law, coerced into commercial contracts, extorted, and forced into peonage and/or involuntary servitude.

THERE IS NO 'CORPUS DELICTI'

- 32. I, Kevin: Walker, *sui juris*, state for the record, that regarding Fraudulent Trust action/CASE NO.: SWM2303376, there is no corpus delicti—no injured party, no damaged property, and no sworn affidavit of harm from any living man or woman. Therefore, this matter is *without* merit, lacks standing, and constitutes an improper attempt to impose authority without lawful jurisdiction. Any further action absent evidence of a valid cause of action is a violation of due process and a deprivation of rights under color of law.
- 33. As a direct result of egregious due process violations and the initiation of a fraudulent CASE/trust action #SWM2303376 by Defendants, against Plaintiff, Plaintiff was subjected to an unlawful arrest, physical restraint in the form of handcuffs, and acts constituting torture. These actions inflicted severe mental trauma, undue stress, and significant mental anguish upon Affiant, all in blatant violation of constitutional protections and fundamental principles of justice.

government registration or stickers, and was displaying a PRIVATE plate.

35. Upon being unlawfully stopped and arrested by Gregory D Eastwood,

evidenced by the 'PRIVATE' plate on the private automobile.

UCC1 filing #2024385925-4 (Exhibit C).

(Exhibits X and Y).

36. The <u>private</u> automobile is duly reflected on Private UCC Contract Trust/

37. Under threat, duress, and coercion, and at gunpoint, Gregory D Eastwood

and Robert C V Bowman were presented with American national/non-citizen

national PASSPORT CARD #C35510079 and PASSPORT BOOK #A39235161

38. Defendants, willfully and intentionally acted against the Bill of Rights, State

Constitution, and Constitution of the United States, even when reminded of

FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE

34. The <u>private</u> automobile and <u>trust property</u> was not in any way displaying STATE or

Robert C V Bowman, William Pratt, and George Reyes, Affiant, informed all

Defendants who willfully conspired on the scene in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

241 and 242, that Affiant was a American national of the republic, non-citizen

national/national/internationally protected person, privately traveling in a

<u>private</u> automobile/conveyance, as articulated by Affiant and as also clearly

- 1 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 8
- 9
- 10 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 2122
- 23
- 24
- 25
- 2627
- 28

39. I, Kevin, *proceeding sui juris*, by *Special Limited Appearance*, further asserts and establishes <u>on the record</u> that the undisputedly unlawful and

their duties to support and uphold the Constitution.

- and establishes on the record that the undisputedly unlawful and unconstitutional stop, arrest, and subsequent actions of the Defendants/
 - Respondents are in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the united States of America and constitute an unlawful arrest and seizure.
- The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, as articulated by the <u>U.S.</u>
- <u>Supreme Court</u>, establishes that <u>any</u> evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful stop or detainment is tainted and inadmissible in <u>any</u> subsequent
- proceedings. The unlawful actions of Gregory D. Eastwood, Robert C. V.

Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, and Robert Gell including but not

and coercion, render all actions and evidence derived therefrom *void ab*

initio. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

limited to the issuance of fraudulent citations/contracts under threat, duress,

4 5

6

7 8

9

10 11

12

13

14 15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23 24

25

26

27

28

40. I, Kevin, proceeding sui juris, hereby re-affirm, re-asset, declare, and assert that all actions, evidence, and instruments obtained in connection with the unlawful stop and arrest are inadmissible and void as fruits of the poisonous tree. This includes, but is not limited to, Trust action/CASE/ CONTRACT #SWM2303376 and/or Trust action/CASE/CONTRACT #B038555 (Exhibit J) and/or Trust action/CASE/CONTRACT #MISW2501134, which was executed under duress, threat, and coercion, while Affiant was unlawfully deprived of liberty and imprisoned against his will, without Affiant's consent.

- 41. Again, for the record, I, Kevin, proceeding sui juris, by Special Limited Appearance, I simply wish to be left alone in peace and not be harassed, stalked, robbed, deprived under color of law, coerced into commercial contracts, extorted, and/or forced into peonage and/or involuntary servitude. I have NOT injured any man or woman nor have I damaged any property. FAILURE TO PROVIDE PROOF AND EVIDENCE
- 42. Defendants are deemed to have unequivocally agreed by tacit acquiescence that any further attempt to prosecute, proceed, or interfere in these matters shall constitute fraud, deprivation of rights under color of law, judicial fraud, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, racketeering (RICO), and multiple violations of federal law, including but not limited to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 1962.
- 43. Defendants agree and accept that these matters must be immediately dismissed and terminated with prejudice, and that any continued action, omission, or obstruction shall constitute willful and knowing

3

4

5

67

8

10

11

1213

14

15

1617

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

2627

28

misconduct under color of law, exposing all involved to personal liability, commercial lien enforcement, and lawful remedy in equity. Affiant and/or Plaintiff(s) accept no liability for any damages arising from your failure to act in honor or law

NO QUALIFIED OR LIMITED IMMUNITY

- 44. "When enforcing mere statutes, judges of all courts do not act judicially (and thus are not protected by "qualified" or "limited immunity," SEE: Owen v. City, 445 U.S. 662; Bothke v. Terry, 713 F2d 1404) - "but merely act as an extension as an agent for the involved agency but only in a "ministerial" and not a "discretionary capacity..." Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583; Keller v. P.E., 261 US 428; F.R.C. v. G.E., 281, U.S. 464.
- 45. "Public officials are not immune from suit when they transcend their lawful authority by invading constitutional rights."—AFLCIO v. Woodward, 406 F2d 137 t.
- 46. "Immunity **fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility** while liability promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the government to its people." (Civil Rights) **Rabon vs Rowen Memorial Hospital, Inc.** 269 N.S. 1, 13, 152 SE 1 d 485, 493.
- 47. "Judges not only can be sued over their official acts, but could be held **liable** for injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney's fees." Lezama v. Justice Court, A025829.
- 48. "Ignorance of the law does not excuse misconduct in anyone, least of all in a sworn officer of the law." **In re McCowan** (1917), 177 C. 93, 170 P. 1100.
- 49. "All are presumed to know the law." San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel (1882), 62 C. 641; Dore v. Southern Pacific Co. (1912), 163 C. 182, 124 P. 817; People v. Flanagan (1924), 65 C.A. 268, 223 P. 1014; Lincoln v. Superior Court (1928), 95 C.A. 35, 271 P. 1107; San Francisco Realty Co. v. Linnard (1929), 98 C.A. 33, 276 P. 368.

	Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA — Registered Mail #RF775824950US — Dated: April 17, 2025
1	50. "It is one of the fundamental maxims of the common law that ignorance of
2	the law excuses no one." Daniels v. Dean (1905), 2 C.A. 421, 84 P. 332.
3	51. "the people, not the States, are sovereign." — Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419,
4	2 U.S. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793).
5	52. ALL ARE EQUAL UNDER THE LAW. (God's Law - Moral and Natural
6	Law). Exodus 21:23-25; Lev. 24: 17-21; Deut. 1; 17, 19:21; Mat. 22:36-40; Luke
7	10:17; Col. 3:25. "No one is above the law".
8	53. IN COMMERCE FOR ANY MATTER TO BE RESOLVED MUST BE
9	EXPRESSED. (Heb. 4:16; Phil. 4:6; Eph. 6:19-21). — Legal maxim: "To lie is to
0	go against the mind."
1	54. IN COMMERCE TRUTH IS SOVEREIGN. (Exodus 20:16; Ps. 117:2; John
2	8:32; II Cor. 13:8) Truth is sovereign and the Sovereign tells only the truth.
3	55. TRUTH IS EXPRESSED IN THE FORM OF AN AFFIDAVIT. (Lev. 5:4-5;
4	Lev. 6:3-5; Lev. 19:11-13: Num. 30:2; Mat. 5:33; James 5: 12).
5	56.AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT STANDS AS TRUTH IN
6	COMMERCE. (12 Pet. 1:25; Heb. 6:13-15;). "He who does not deny,
7	admits."
8	57. AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT BECOMES THE JUDGEMENT IN
9	COMMERCE. (Heb. 6:16-17;). "There is nothing left to resolve.
0.	58. WORKMAN IS WORTHY OF HIS HIRE. The first of these is expressed in
1	Exodus 20:15; Lev. 19:13; Mat. 10:10; Luke 10"7; II Tim. 2:6. Legal maxim: "It
22	is against equity for freemen not to have the free disposal of their own
23	property."
24	59. HE WHO LEAVES THE BATTLEFIELD FIRST LOSES BY DEFAULT.
25	(Book of Job; Mat. 10:22) Legal maxim: "He who does not repel a wrong
26	when he can occasions it.")
27	<u>DEFENDANTS' PRESUMPTION OF DISHONOR UNDER U.C.C. § 3-505</u>

AND EVIDENCE PROVING DEFENDANTS' DISHONOR:

23. The failure of Defendants to rebut or provide any valid evidence of their performance is further confirmed by the, 'AFFIDAVIT CERTIFICATE of DISHONOR, NON-RESPONSE, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and LIEN AUTHORIZATION"/Self-Executing Contract Security Agreement (Exhibit H), which is duly notarized and complies with the requirements of U.C.C. § 3-505. 24. Under U.C.C. § 3-505, a document regular in form, such as the notarized Affidavit Certificate serves as evidence of dishonor and creates a presumption of dishonor. U.C.C. § 3-505. Evidence of Dishonor: (a) The following are admissible as evidence and create a presumption of dishonor and of any notice of dishonor stated: (1) A document regular in form as provided in subsection (b) which purports to be a protest; (2) A purported stamp or writing of the drawee, payor bank, or presenting bank on or accompanying the instrument stating that acceptance or payment has been refused unless reasons for the refusal are stated and the reasons are not consistent with dishonor;

1

6

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- (3) A book or record of the drawee, payor bank, or collecting bank, kept in the usual course of business which shows dishonor, even if there is no evidence of who made the entry.
- (b) A protest is a certificate of dishonor made by a United States consul or vice consul, or a notary public or other person authorized to administer oaths by the law of the place where dishonor occurs. It may be made upon information satisfactory to that person. The protest must identify the instrument and certify either that presentment has been made or, if not made, the reason why it was not made, and that the instrument has been dishonored by nonacceptance or nonpayment. The protest may also certify that notice of dishonor has been given to some or all parties.

67

O

10

11 12

> 13 14

15

16

17

18

1920

21

2223

24

25

26

27

28

25. The <u>notarized</u> AFFIDAVIT CERTIFICATE of DISHONOR, NON-
RESPONSE, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and LIEN AUTHORIZATION"/Self-
Executing Contract Security Agreement (Exhibit L), complies with these
requirements and serves as a formal protest and evidence of dishonor under
U.C.C. § 3-505, as it clearly documents Defendants' refusal to respond or provide
the necessary rebuttal to Plaintiff's claims.

- 26. Defendants **have** <u>not</u> submitted any evidence to contradict or rebut the statements made in the affidavits. As a result, the facts set forth in the affidavits are deemed true and uncontested. *Additionally*, the California Evidence Code § 664 and related case law support the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed, and *unrebutted* affidavits stand as **Truth**.
- 27. Defendants may <u>not</u> argue, controvert, or otherwise protest the finality of the administrative findings established through the unrebutted affidavits. As per established legal principles, once an affidavit is submitted and not rebutted, its content is accepted as true, and Defendants are barred from contesting these findings in subsequent processes, whether administrative or judicial.

'Foundation of American Sovereignty:

- 28. The Declaration of Independence (1776) proclaims:
 - "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."
- 29. This foundational document establishes that the people are the true sovereigns of this nation.
- 30. The **U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights** serve as a **contract** that binds the government, securing the People's liberties and **limiting governmental authority**. The **Tenth Amendment** asserts:
 - "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the <u>S</u>tates, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

2. This affirms that any power not granted to the federal government remains with the <u>S</u>tates or the people.

3

SUPREME COURT Affirmations of Sovereignty:

5

31. The **Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS)** has **repeatedly** affirmed that sovereignty resides in the people:

6

• Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793):

7

"The sovereignty resides in the people... they are truly the sovereigns of the country."

8

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886):

10

"Sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts."

11 12

• Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1829):

13

"People of a <u>s</u>tate are entitled to all the rights which formerly belonged to the King by his prerogative."

1415

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803):

16

"A law repugnant to the Constitution is void."

17

Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1973):

18 19 "There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of constitutional rights."

20

Congressional Recognition of Americans as 'Sovereigns':

2122

32. In his **1947** "I **Am an American Day**" **address**, Representative **John F. Kennedy** emphasized the active role <u>C</u>itizens must play in preserving liberty:

23

24

"The fires of liberty must be continually fueled by the positive and conscious actions of all of us." (*IFKLIBRARY.ORG*)

25

26

27

33. Further, Congress formally recognized the significance of American sovereignty through the establishment of "I Am An American Day," later

28 designated as Citizenship Day:

"Whereas it is desirable that the <u>sovereign citizens</u> of our <u>Nation</u> be prepared for the responsibilities and impressed with the significance of their status in our self-governing Republic: Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the third Sunday in May each year be, and hereby is, set aside as Citizenship Day..."

This resolution affirms the foundational principle that sovereignty resides with the people, who are responsible for preserving and exercising their rights and freedoms.

Status as a "national" and "state Citizen":

- 34. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21), the term national is defined as:
 - "A person owing permanent allegiance to a state."
 - Furthermore, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(B)(22) defines national of the United States as: "(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States."
- 35. This distinction is clear: one can be a *national* without being a <u>citizen</u> of the United States, reinforcing the concept of sovereignty associated with state citizenship.

Distinction Between "state Citizen" and "citizen of the United States"

- 36. The Courts have **long** recognized that *state citizenship* and *U.S. citizenship* **are distinct** legal statuses:
 - United States v. Anthony (1873)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- "The Fourteenth Amendment creates and defines citizenship of the United States. It had long been contended, and had been held by many learned authorities, and had never been judicially decided to the contrary, that there was no such thing as a citizen of the United States, except as that condition arose from citizenship of some state."
- Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)
 - "It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States and a

6

7

8 9

10

11 12

13

14 15

16

17

18

19 20

21

22

23

24 25

26

27

28

citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual."

- United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)
 - "We have in our political system a Government of the United States and a government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect."
- Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874); McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320 (1883):

"One may be a citizen of a State and yet not a citizen of the United States."

- Tashiro v. Jordan, 201 Cal. 236 (1927):
 - "That there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a state, and the privileges and immunities of one are not the same as the other is well established by the decisions of the courts of this country."
- Crosse v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 221 A.2d 431 (1966): "Both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, it has not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the United States in order to be a citizen of his state."
- Jones v. Temmer, 829 F.Supp. 1226 (USDC/DCO 1993):
 - "The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects very few rights because it neither incorporates any of the Bill of Rights nor protects all rights of individual citizens... Instead, this provision protects only those rights peculiar to being a citizen of the federal government; it does not protect those rights which relate to state citizenship."
- 37. The first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
 - "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, <u>and</u> subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the state wherein they reside."

- 1
- 2
- 3 4
- 5
- 6
- 8
- 10
- 11 12
- 13
- 14
- 15 16
- 17
- 18
- 19 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24 25
- 26
- 27
- 28

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, are subject to the

38. However, this clause does **NOT** state:

- jurisdiction thereof..."
- 39. This confirms that United States citizenship requires both:
 - H. Being born or naturalized in the United States, and
 - I. Being subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

Status as "national" / "non-citizen national" (state Citizen)

- 39. The U.S. Department of State document, Certificates of Non-Citizen Nationality (https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legalconsiderations/us-citizenship/Certificates-Non-Citizen-Nationality.html), states:
 - "Section 101(a)(21) of the INA defines the term 'national' as 'a person owing permanent allegiance to a state.' Section 101(a)(22) of the INA provides that the term 'national of the United States' includes all U.S. citizens as well as persons who, though not citizens of the United States, owe permanent allegiance to the United States (non-citizen nationals)."
 - 40. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(22) defines national of the United States as:
 - "(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States."
- 41. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) explicitly stipulates that one can be a 'national of the United States' without being a 'citizen of the United States' if they owe permanent allegiance to the United States.
 - 42. 22 CFR § 51.2 stipulates that Passports are issued to nationals only:
 - "A passport may be issued only to a U.S. national."
 - 43. 22 CFR § 51.3 stipulates the Types of passports issued:
 - "(a) A regular passport is issued to a national of the United States."
 - "(e) A passport card is issued to a national of the United States on the same basis as a regular passport."

28

44. **18 U.S.C. § 112** stipulates that Protections of foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons, **apply to nationals**. This statute defines terms such as "foreign government," "foreign official," "internationally protected person" "international organization" "national of

"internationally protected person," "international organization," "national of the United States," and "official guest," have the same meaning.

- 45. It is unequivocally true that **18 U.S.C. § 112** states that in addition to being a *national*, a *national* is also considered a:
 - foreign government
 - foreign official
 - · internationally protected person
 - · international organization
 - · national of the United States
 - official guest
 - 46. The legal framework and court rulings confirm that:
 - One may be a "state Citizen" without being a citizen of the United States."
 - The Fourteenth Amendment created *U.S. citizenship*, which is distinct from *state citizenship*.
 - A *national* is someone who owes permanent allegiance to a <u>s</u>tate, not necessarily to the United States.
 - A *national of the United States* could be a *U.S. citizen*, but could also be a *non-citizen national* who owes allegiance without being a U.S. citizen.

Thus, the distinction between *state Citizens* and *U.S. citizens* is a well-established legal principle with profound implications on sovereignty, rights, and legal obligations.

<u>Unrebutted Affidavits, Considered, Agreed, and Stipulated Facts,</u> <u>Contract Security Agreements, and Authorized Judgement and Lien:</u>

47. Plaintiff and Defendants are parties to certain Contracts and Security Agreements, specifically contract security agreement numbers

- 1 RF775821088US, #RF775821088US, #RF775822582US, and #RF775823645US.
- 2 Each contract security agreement and/or self-executing contract security
- 3 agreement was received, considered, and agreed to by Defendants through
- 4 silent acquiescence, tacit agreement, and tacit procuration. Each contract
- 5 also includes a corresponding Form 3811, which was signed as evidence of
- 6 receipt. AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT STANDS AS TRUTH IN
- 7 COMMERCE. (12 Pet. 1:25; Heb. 6:13-15;). 'He who does not deny, admits.
- 8 AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT BECOMES THE JUDGEMENT IN
- 9 COMMERCE. (Heb. 6:16-17;). 'There is nothing left to resolve.' All
- 10 referenced contracts and signed Forms 3811 are attached hereto as **Exhibits E**,
- 11 **F, G, H, I, J, K, and L** respectively, as follows:

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- Exhibit E: Contract Security Agreement #RF775820621US, titled: NOTICE OF CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE, and FRAUD, RACKETEERING,
 CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW,
 IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION, COERCION, TREASON.
- Exhibit F: Contract Security Agreement #RF775821088US, titled: NOTICE OF DEFAULT, and FRAUD, RACKETEERING, CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW, IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION, COERCION, TREASON
- Exhibit G: Contract Security Agreement #RF775822582US, titled: NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND OPPORTUNITY TO CURE <u>AND</u> NOTICE OF FRAUD, RACKETEERING, CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW, IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION, COERCION, KIDNAPPING.
- Exhibit H: Contract Security Agreement #RF775823645US, titled: Affidavit Certificate of Dishonor, Non-response, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and LIEN AUTHORIZATION.
- Exhibit I: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit E.

- Exhibit J: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit F.
- Exhibit K: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit G.
- Exhibit L: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit H.

11

12

13

14

18

48. Self-Executing Contract Security Agreement #RF775823645US (Exhibit L)

was *received*, *considered*, and *agreed* to by Defendants, acknowledging and accepting a Judgement, Summary Judgement, and Lien Authorization (in accordance with U.C.C. § 9-509), against Defendants in the amount of One Trillion Dollars (\$1,000,000,000,000,000) in lawfully recognized currency, such as gold and silver coin, as authorized under Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, in favor of Plaintiff.

49. Defendants have a duty to respond to all of Plaintiff's NOTICES and binding CONTRACTS, and have intentionally and willfully remained silent and and dishonor.

50. Defendants have *received*, *considered*, and *agreed* to <u>all</u> the terms of all contract agreements, including the <u>Self-Executing</u> Contract

Security Agreement (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), constituting a bona fide contract under the principles of contract law and the Uniform

Commercial Code (U.C.C.). Pursuant to the mailbox rule, which establishes that <u>acceptance of an offer is effective when dispatched</u> (U.C.C. § 2-206. Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract) and <u>principles</u> of <u>silent acquiescence</u>, <u>tacit procuration</u>, and <u>tacit</u> agreement, the acceptance is valid. This acceptance is in alignment with the doctrine of 'offer and acceptance' and the provisions of U.C.C. § 2-202, which governs the <u>final</u> expression of the CONTRACT.

Furthermore, under the U.C.C., all assets—whether registered or unregistered—are held subject to the <u>allodial</u> title, with Plaintiff maintaining sole and exclusive standing over all real property, assets, securities, both tangible and intangible, registered and unregistered, as

evidenced by UCC1 filing NOTICE #2024385925-4 and UCC3 filing and

1

NOTICE #2024402990-2 (Exhibits C and D).

3

No Agreement to Arbitration and Defendants are Barred from Contesting any of the established Facts:

5

7 A

8

10

11

determinations.

12 13

14 15

16 17

18

19 20

21

22

23

2425

26

28

51. **No Stipulation to Arbitration**: It is important to assert that there is no stipulation to arbitration as evidenced by the *unrebutted* <u>verified</u> commercial **Affidavits** (Exhibits E, F, G, and H). These **Affidavits** present facts that all parties have agreed to. Consequently, all issues are considered settled according to the principles of *res judicata*, *stare decisis*, *and collateral estoppel*, barring Defendants from contesting any of the findings, established facts, conclusions, or

<u>Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Provisions Supporting</u> Plaintiff's Claims

52. U.C.C. § 1-103 – Construction and Application of the Code: U.C.C. § 1-103 ensures that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) applies to commercial transactions unless explicitly stated otherwise. This section incorporates principles of law and equity, ensuring that:

- Common law principles of fraud, duress, and misrepresentation remain applicable and do not negate the enforceability of valid contracts.
- The UCC is to be **liberally construed** to promote fair dealing and uphold the **validity of commercial agreements**.
- Any contract entered into in good faith is binding, unless proven otherwise through clear, rebuttable evidence.

In this case, Defendants failed to rebut the terms set forth in the contract and security agreements, thereby affirming their full enforceability under U.C.C. § 1-103.

53. U.C.C. § 2-202 – Final Written Expression, Parol or Extrinsic Evidence: Under U.C.C. § 2-202, when a written contract is intended as a <u>final</u> and complete expression of an agreement, its terms <u>cannot</u> be contradicted by

prior agreements, oral statements, or extrinsic evidence. This section ensures

2

that:

3

5

7

8

10

11

12 13

14

15

In this case, Defendants:

17

18

1920

21

22

23

2425

26

27

28

•	The contract and security agreements, as presented in the <u>verified</u> commercial
	Affidavits, are the final and complete expression of the parties' agreement.

- Defendants cannot introduce oral statements, prior discussions, or extrinsic
 evidence to dispute or alter the contract's terms.
 - Any modifications to the contract must be explicitly made in writing and agreed upon by both parties.

Since Defendants failed to rebut the contract and affidavits, U.C.C. § 2-202 bars any claims of ambiguity or modification, affirming the enforceability of Plaintiff's claims.

54. U.C.C. § 2-204 – Formation of Contract: U.C.C. § 2-204 establishes that a contract is legally formed when there is:

- 1. Intent to contract between the parties.
- 2. Agreement on essential terms, even if minor terms remain open.
- 3. Performance or conduct demonstrating acceptance of the contract.
- **Demonstrated intent** through their silence, non-response, and acquiescence.
- Accepted the terms by failing to dispute the verified affidavits, making the agreement self-executing and binding.
- **Performed in a manner that affirmed the contract**, either by engaging in financial transactions, receiving notices, **or** failing to object.

As a result, under U.C.C. § 2-204, the contract is legally enforceable, and arbitration or further negotiations are unnecessary.

- 55. U.C.C. § 2-206 Offer and Acceptance in Contract Formation: U.C.C. § 2-206 establishes that:
 - An offer is deemed accepted when the offeree engages in conduct consistent with acceptance.

2. A contract is formed when an offer is accepted, even if conditions or

1 2

objections are not expressly stated.

3

Applying this to Plaintiff's verified claims:

4

 Defendants received and considered the verified affidavits, contract, and security agreements but failed to respond or contest them.

67

 Under U.C.C. § 2-206, Defendants' silence constitutes acceptance, making the contract and obligations binding and enforceable.

8

• The verified commercial affidavits and supporting exhibits serve as prima facie evidence of the existence and validity of the contract.

9

Thus, under U.C.C. § 1-103, 2-204, 2-206, and 3-303 Plaintiff's verified claims are fully enforceable, and Defendants' failure to rebut any of them constitutes uncontested acceptance.

12

13

11

56. U.C.C. § 3-303 – Value and Consideration for Negotiable

Instruments: U.C.C. § 3-303 defines value and consideration in the

enforcement of negotiable instruments. A negotiable instrument is issued

for value when:

16

17

15

• It is **given in exchange for a promise of performance** or to satisfy a pre-existing obligation.

1819

• The holder takes it in good faith and without notice of defects.

20

• It provides financial or legal benefit to the party receiving it.

21

In this case:

2223

 Plaintiff provided value through agreements, instruments, and affidavits, which Defendants considered and accepted.

24

• Defendants' willful failure to dispute the obligation confirms that consideration was validly exchanged.

2526

Under U.C.C. § 3-303, Defendants cannot claim a lack of consideration to avoid liability, as their conduct establishes their acceptance of value.

2728

57. U.C.C. § 9-509 – Authorization of Financing Statement; Obligation of

Debtor: Under U.C.C. § 9-509, a secured party is authorized to file a financing

6

12

13

11

14

15

16

18

19

17

2021

23

22

25

2526

27

28

•	The debtor	has authenticated	a security agreement	covering the collateral
	THE action	mus authemented	a security agreement	covering the condicion

- The secured party has control over the collateral as agreed in the security instrument.
- The debtor's failure to rebut or contest the filing **constitutes authorization by default**.
- The debtor authorizes the filing in an authenticated record.

In this case:

statement when:

- Defendants' failure to rebut the security agreement affirms that the lien and financing statement are valid and enforceable.
- The self-executing contract and security agreement serve as authenticated proof under U.C.C. § 9-509.
- Plaintiff, as a secured party, has the full legal right to perfect and enforce their lien against Defendants' assets.
- Thus, under U.C.C. § 9-509, Plaintiff's lien is properly perfected and enforceable as a matter of law.
- 58. U.C.C. § 9-102 Definitions and Scope of Security Interests: U.C.C. § 9-102 provides definitions crucial to the enforcement of security agreements, including:
 - "Secured Party" A person in whose favor a security interest is created.
 - "Debtor" A person who has granted a security interest in collateral.
 - "Collateral" Property subject to a security interest.

Applying U.C.C. § 9-102 to this matter:

- Plaintiff is **the secured party** with **enforceable rights over collateral** under the security agreement.
- Defendants, by failing to contest the claim, have conceded their role as debtors.

3

5

67

8

10

9

12

11

13

15

1617

18

1920

21

2223

24

25

26

2728

- The assets in question, including property, negotiable instruments, and funds, are collateral lawfully secured by Plaintiff.
- Under U.C.C. § 9-102, the contractual security interests are valid, perfected, and enforceable against Defendants, who have waived all objections through inaction.
- 59. Plaintiff asserts that the provisions of the **Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)**, as outlined above, establish that:
 - Contracts, negotiable instruments, and security agreements are enforceable under commercial law.
 - 2. Defendants' silence, failure to rebut, and inaction constitute binding acceptance under U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-206, and 9-509.
 - Defendants have waived all rights to contest the contract, and any claims of fraud, duress, or invalidity are legally barred under U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 2-202, and 3-303.
- Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to <u>full enforcement</u> of <u>all</u> claims, security interests, and remedies under the U.C.C.
- 60. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), Defendants may <u>not</u> argue, controvert, or otherwise protest the finality of the administrative findings established through the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits. As per established legal principles and <u>legal maxims</u>, once an affidavit is submitted and not rebutted, its content is accepted as true, and Defendants are <u>estopped</u> and <u>barred</u> from contesting these findings in subsequent processes, <u>whether</u> administrative or judicial.
- 61. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the *unrebutted* verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), Defendants or the entity they represent_is/are the <u>DEBTOR(S)</u> in this matter.

- 1 2

- 62. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), Defendants are <u>NOT</u> the CREDITOR, or an ASSIGNEE of the CREDITOR, in this matter.
- 63. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), Defendants are indebted to Plaintiff in the amount of One Trillion Dollars (\$1,000,000,000,000.00) in lawfully recognized currency, such as gold and silver coin, as authorized under Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution.
- 64. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), Defendants do NOT have 'standing.'
- 65. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), under California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(c), summary judgement is appropriate when there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. The <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits E, F, G, and H) submitted by Plaintiff demonstrate that no triable issues of material fact remain in dispute, and Plaintiff is <u>entitled</u> to judgement based on the evidence presented and as *a matter of law*.
- 66. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), "Statements of **fact** contained in affidavits which are **not** rebutted by the opposing party's **affidavit or pleadings** <u>may</u>[must] be accepted as **true** by the trial court." --Winsett v. Donaldson, 244 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1976).

orified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), the principles of *res judicata*, *stare* decisis, and collateral estoppel apply to the *unrebutted* commercial affidavits, establishing that all issues are deemed settled and *cannot* be contested further.

These *principles* reinforce the finality of the administrative findings and support

the granting of summary judgement, as a matter of law. - 'HE WHO LEAVES THE BATTLEFIELD FIRST LOSES BY DEFAULT.'

Judgement of \$1,000,000,000,000.00 Received, Considered, Agreed

to, and Authorized:

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

17

18

19

20

21

24

25

26

27

28

68. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), Defendants fully authorize, endorse, support, and advocate for the entry of a UCC commercial judgement and lien in the amount of One Trillion Dollars (\$1,000,000,000,000.00) in lawfully recognized currency, such as gold and silver coin, as authorized under Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, against Defendants, in favor of Plaintiff, as also evidenced by INVOICE/TRUE BILL #RIVSHERTREAS12312024 which is a part of Exhibit H. INVOICE/TRUE BILL #RIVSHERTREAS12312024 is attached hereto as Exhibit M and incorporated herein by reference.

69. As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), should it be **deemed** necessary, the Plaintiff is <u>fully Authorized</u> to initiate the filing of a lien, and the seizing of property to secure satisfaction of the ADJUDGED, DECREED, AND <u>AUTHORIZED</u> sum total due to <u>Affiant</u>, and/or Plaintiff of, One Trillion Dollars (\$1,000,000,000,000,000.00) in lawfully recognized currency, such as gold and silver coin, as authorized under Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution.

-34 of 116

2

3

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA — Registered Mail #RF775824950US — Dated: April 17, 2025

Defendants' Actions as Acts of War Against the Constitution:

70. The Defendants' conduct constitutes an **outright war against the Constitution** of the United States, its *principles*, and the **rule of law**. By their *bad faith* and deplorable actions, the defendants have demonstrated *willful and intentional* disregard and contempt for the **supreme law of the land**, as set forth in **Article VI**, **Clause 2 of the Constitution**, which declares that the Constitution,

federal laws, and treaties are the supreme law of the land, binding upon all states,

courts, and officers.

- 71. **Violations of Constitutional Protections:** The defendants have intentionally and systematically engaged in acts that directly violate the protections guaranteed to the Plaintiff and the people under the Constitution, including but not limited to:
 - Violation of the Plaintiff's Unalienable Rights: The defendants have deprived the Plaintiff of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, as guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
 - Subversion of the Rule of Law: Through their actions, the defendants have
 undermined the separation of powers and checks and balances established
 by the Constitution. They have disregarded the judiciary's duty to uphold
 the Constitution by attempting to operate outside the confines of lawful
 authority, rendering themselves effectively unaccountable.
 - Treasonous Conduct: Pursuant to Article III, Section 3, treason against
 the United States is defined as levying war against them or adhering to
 their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. The defendants' conduct
 in subverting the constitutional order, depriving citizens of their
 lawful rights, and unlawfully exercising power without jurisdiction
 constitutes a form of domestic treason against the Constitution and the
 people it protects.
- 72. **Acts of Aggression and Tyranny:** The defendants' actions amount to a usurpation of authority and a direct attack on the sovereignty of the people, who

3

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 73. **Weaponizing Authority to Oppress:** The defendants' intentional misuse of their authority to act against the interests of the Constitution and its <u>C</u>itizens is a clear manifestation of tyranny. Rather than serving their constitutional mandate to protect and defend the Constitution, they have actively waged war on it by:
 - Suppressing lawful claims and evidence presented by the Plaintiff to protect their property and rights.
 - Engaging in acts of fraud, coercion, and racketeering that strip Plaintiff of their constitutional protections.
 - Dismissing the jurisdictional authority of constitutional mandates, including but not limited to rights to due process and equal protection under the law.

74. The defendants' actions are not merely breaches of law; they are acts of *insurrection* and rebellion against the very foundation of the nation's constitutional framework. Such acts must not go unchallenged, as they jeopardize the constitutional order, the rights of the people, and the rule of law that ensures justice and equality. Plaintiff call upon the court and relevant authorities to enforce the Constitution, compel accountability, and halt the defendants' treasonous war against the supreme law of the land.

'Bare Statutes' as Confirmation of Guilt and the Necessity of Prosecution by an Enforcer:

75. Plaintiff's incorporation of "bare statutes" does <u>NOT</u> exonerate Defendants; rather, it serves as evidence of Defendants' guilt, which they have already

undisputedly admitted through their actions and lack of rebuttal to any affidavits, which they have a duty to respond to. The invocation of bare statutes merely underscores the necessity for Plaintiff to compel a formal enforcer, such as a District Attorney or Attorney General, to prosecute the criminal violations. This requirement for enforcement does **NOT** negate the Defendants' culpability but, instead, affirms the gravity of their admitted violations.

76. In this matter, the Plaintiff has thoroughly detailed the Defendants' willful and intentional breaches of multiple federal statutes under Title 18, and Plaintiff's private right(s) of action.

77. Defendants' actions constitute **treasonous** conduct against the **Constitution and the American people**. Their behavior, alongside that of their counsel, reflects an attitude of being above the law, further solidifying their guilt.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

22

23

28

Defendants' Presumed to be in Dishonor: U.C.C. § 3-505:

- 78. Defendants are **presumed** to be in **dishonor**, in accordance with U.C.C. § 3-505, as evidenced by the attached Affidavit Certificate of Dishonor, Non-response, **DEFAULT**, JUDGEMENT, and LIEN AUTHORIZATION (Exhibit H).
- 79. Defendants **have <u>not</u>** submitted any evidence to contradict or rebut the statements made in the affidavits. As a result, the facts set forth in the affidavits are deemed true and uncontested. *Additionally*, the California Evidence Code § 664 and related case law support the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed, and *unrebutted* affidavits stand as **Truth**.
- 80. Defendants may <u>NOT</u> argue, controvert, or otherwise protest the finality of the administrative findings established through the unrebutted affidavits. As per established legal principles, once an affidavit is submitted and not rebutted, its content is accepted as true, and Defendants are barred from contesting these findings in subsequent processes, whether administrative or judicial.

3

5

10

11

12

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

22

23

24

25

28

Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA — Registered Mail #RF775824950US — Dated: April 17, 2025

'Special Deposit' and MASTER INDEMNITY BOND: 31 U.S. Code § 5312 and U.C.C. § 3-104

81. This notarized, authorized, and indorsed VERIFIED COMPLAINT itself acted as a BOND and/or MONETARY INSTRUMENT, as defined by 31 U.S. Code § 5312 and U.C.C. § 3-104, supplemented by the MASTER INDEMNITY BOND (Exhibit N), and that the BOND also satisfies the procedural and substantive requirements of Rule 67 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Exclusive equity supports this claim, as it ensures that no competing claims will infringe upon the Plaintiff's established rights to this bond of and will be reported on the forms 1099-A, 1099-OID, and/or 1099-B, with Plaintiff evidenced as the CREDITOR(S). 82. Janet Yellen, said Successor(s), and/or the <u>U</u>nited <u>States Treasury</u> is the registered holder and fiduciary of/for Plaintiff's the private Two Hundred Billion Dollar (\$200,000,000,000.00 USD) 'MASTER DISCHARGE AND INDEMNITY BOND' #RF661448567US, which was post deposited to private post registered account #RF 661 448 023 US. Said 'MASTER DISCHARGE AND INDEMNITY BOND' (#RF661448567US) expressly stipulates it is "insuring, underwriting, indemnifying, discharging, paying and satisfying all such account holders and accounts dollar for dollar against any and all pre-existing, current and future losses, costs, debts, taxes, encumbrances, deficits, deficiencies, liens, judgements, true bills, obligations of contract or performance, defaults, charges, and any and all other obligations as may exist or come to exist during the term of this Bond... Each of the said account holders and accounts shall be severally insured, underwritten and indemnified against any and all future Liabilities as may appear, thereby instantly satisfying all such obligations dollar for dollar without exception through the above-noted Private Offset Accounts up to and including the full face value of this Bond through maturity." A copy of 'MASTER DISCHARGE AND INDEMNITY BOND' #RF372320890US is attached hereto as Exhibit N and incorporated herein by reference, and will serve as an additional CAUTION and/

Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA — Registered Mail #RF775824950US — Dated: April 17, 2025

and/or BOND for immediate adjustment and setoff of any and all costs associated with these matters.

1

4

6

7

10

11

12

13

14

15

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

25

26

12 U.S.C. 1813(L)(1): The term 'Deposit' Defined

83. As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendants in the unrebutted verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), as under 12 U.S.C. 1813(L)(1), ["] the term 'deposit' means — the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank or savings association in the usual course of business and for which it has given or is obligated to give credit, either conditionally or unconditionally, to a commercial, checking, savings, time, or thrift account, or which is evidenced by its certificate of deposit, thrift certificate, investment certificate, certificate of indebtedness, or other similar name, or a check or draft drawn against a deposit account and certified by the bank or savings association, or a letter of credit or a traveler's check on which the bank or savings association is primarily liable: Provided, That, without limiting the generality of the term "money or its equivalent", any such account or instrument must be regarded as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of money when credited or issued in exchange for checks or drafts or for a promissory note upon which the person obtaining any such credit or instrument is primarily or secondarily liable, or for a charge against a deposit account, or in settlement of checks, drafts, or other instruments forwarded to such bank or savings association for collection.["]

GENERALLY Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)

84. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendants in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), Defendants never at any time risked any of its assets and truly only exchanged the GENUINE ORIGINAL PROMISSORY NOTE for "credit" according to the **Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)**. 'Banks' are <u>required</u> to adhere Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and as <u>evidenced</u> by, <u>12 U.S.C 1831n - 'Accounting objectives</u>,

Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA — Registered Mail #RF775824950US — Dated: April 17, 2025

standards, and requirements': ["](2) Standards (A)Uniform accounting principles consistent with GAAP Subject to the requirements of this chapter and any other provision of Federal law, the accounting principles applicable to reports or statements required to be filed with Federal banking agencies by all insured depository institutions shall be uniform and consistent with generally accepted accounting principles.["]

85. As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendants in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), GAAP follows an accounting convention that lies at the heart of the double-entry bookkeeping system called the Matching Principle. This principle works are follows: when a bank accepts bullion, coin, currency, drafts, promissory notes, or any other similar instruments (hereinafter "instruments") from customers and deposits or records the instruments as assets, it must record offsetting liabilities that match the assets that it accepted from customers. The <u>liabilities</u> represent the amounts that the <u>bank owes the customers</u>, funds accepted from customers. If a fractional reserve banking system like the United States banking system, most of the funds advanced to borrowers (assets held by banks) are created by the banks, once they purchase/acquire the TRUE Creditor's Asset (NOTE, ORDER, DRAFT, LETTER OF CREDIT, MONEY ORDER, SECURITY, ETC.) and are not merely transferred from one set of depositors to another set of borrowers. Said Asset remains an Asset to Plaintiff.

86. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendants in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), GAAP is <u>intended</u> to <u>ensure</u> consistency among financial records, financial transparency, and protection from fraud or misleading company reports.

Summary Judgement is Due as a matter of law

87. Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(c): Summary Judgment is warranted as <u>a matter of law</u> under

3

5

6

7

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2122

23

24

25

26

27

28

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure <u>and</u> California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(c), both of which *mandate* judgment where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.

- 88. **Defendants are** *barred* from further dispute under the doctrines of:
 - Res Judicata This matter is already conclusively settled by Defendants' failure to rebut.
 - *Stare Decisis* Binding precedent supports Plaintiff's claims and demands judgment in their favor.
 - Collateral Estoppel Defendants are estopped from raising any defenses they failed to assert.
- 89. *Unrebutted* Affidavits Establish No Disputed Facts: Plaintiff's affidavits were submitted in good faith and stand as truth in commerce. These affidavits were served upon Defendants, providing sufficient notice and opportunity to rebut or contest the assertions therein. Defendants' failure to respond or dispute the affidavits results in a legal presumption of their validity. As a matter of law, an affidavit that is *unrebutted* is deemed admitted and undisputed, thereby precluding any triable issue of fact.
 - Pursuant to **Res Judicata**, the unrebutted affidavits have the same force and effect as a **judgment** and are now binding upon Defendants.
 - Under the principle of Stare Decisis, binding precedent affirms that undisputed affidavits establish facts conclusively in a civil proceeding.
 - Collateral Estoppel bars Defendants from re-litigating any issue previously resolved by the unrebutted affidavits, as they have failed to raise a substantive dispute within the prescribed timeframes.
 - 90. Defendants' Failure to Produce Contradictory Evidence:
- Defendants have neither provided competent evidence to dispute Plaintiff's claims nor identified any material fact requiring trial. Plaintiff's affidavits, contracts, and

supporting documents (attached hereto as *Exhibits E, F, G, and H*) collectively

2

3

4

5

8

9

10 11

12 13

14

16

17

18 19

2021

22

2324

25

2627

28

triable issue, Plaintiff is **entitled** to judgment as <u>a matter of law</u>.

91. **Judicially Recognized Finality of Affidavits**: Courts have long held that when **Affidavits** are left *unrebutted*, they stand as Truth and are accepted as fact. See **Morris v. National Cash Register Co., 44 Cal.App.2d 811, 813 (1941)**, which

establish the absence of any genuine dispute. Without contradictory evidence or a

Additionally, under Federal and State Rules of Evidence, facts established by affidavit are considered *binding* when no counter-affidavit is provided.

confirms that undisputed evidence is sufficient to warrant summary judgment.

92. Supported by Principles of Equity and Law:

- Equity: It would be inequitable to allow Defendants to delay proceedings
 when they have failed to rebut or contest the factual assertions of
 Plaintiff's affidavits.
- Law: Plaintiff has satisfied the procedural and substantive requirements for summary judgment, including providing sufficient admissible evidence to establish their claims.

The COURT is Barred From SUMMARILY DISMISSING Anything, Especially After The Overturning of Chevron

- 93. The Court is hereby placed on notice that even the mere consideration of "summarily dismissing" anything in this matter constitutes a <u>constitutional</u> <u>violation</u> and an act of judicial overreach, arbitrary denial of due process, and a *willful* obstruction of justice.
- 94. The *Overturning* of the Chevron Doctrine Eliminates *Any* Judicial *Presumption* in Favor of Government or Institutional Parties:.
 - With the Chevron Doctrine overturned, courts no longer have
 discretion to defer to agency or institutional interpretations of law,
 and every case must be ruled strictly within the confines of the
 Constitution and statutory law.

1

- 4
- 5
- 7
- 8
- 10
- 11 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16 17
- 18
- 19 20
- 21
- 22
- 2324
- 25
- 26
- 2728

- Any judicial attempt to summarily dismiss Plaintiff's verified, unrebutted claims would constitute an abuse of discretion, a deprivation of due process, and a direct violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
- 95. Due Process Requires Full Adjudication, Not Summary Disposition.
 - Plaintiff has filed multiple verified, sworn affidavits, which have gone uncontested and unrebutted, and stand as Truth.
 - Under U.C.C. § 3-505, an unrebutted Affidavit creates a presumption of dishonor, which the Court cannot arbitrarily ignore.
 - Under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, Plaintiff has the right to compel the performance of a legal duty owed to them by the Court.
 - A case may only be dismissed summarily if there is no valid claim or
 cause of action—which is inapplicable here, as Defendants have already
 defaulted and dishonored themselves by failing to rebut the Plaintiff's
 Conditional Acceptance, and they have admitted everything presented in
 all Affidavits.
- 96. Any Attempt to Dismiss Would Be a Violation of *Res Judicata, Stare Decisis,* and Collateral Estoppel.
 - Res Judicata: The matters before this Court are already settled and decided, and no further litigation is necessary to determine the legal obligations of Defendants.
 - Stare Decisis: The binding legal precedents of Marbury v. Madison, Rule 56 FRCP, and California CCP § 437c(c) require judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.
 - Collateral Estoppel: Defendants cannot dispute issues they have already
 defaulted on; any attempt to dismiss the case would ignore the finality of
 Plaintiff's unrebutted claims and the legally binding nature of their
 conditional acceptance.
- 97. Summary Dismissal Would Constitute <u>Judicial Fraud</u> and Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

As a public trustee of justice, the Court has a fiduciary obligation to

11

12

13

14

15

1617

18

19 20

21

2223

24

25

2627

28

- uphold constitutional rights and due process.
 Any attempt to dismiss this matter—given that Defendants have already defaulted—would be tantamount to judicial fraud and an egregious
 - breach of duty under 28 U.S.C. § 1361.

NOTICE to the COURT: A DEMAND is NOT a mere MOTION

- 98. The Court is hereby placed on notice that Plaintiff's *Demand* for Summary Judgment is not a mere 'motion' *requesting* discretionary relief but a <u>binding</u> legal notice asserting an *absolute* <u>right</u> to judgment as a matter of law.
 - 99. A Motion is a Request; A Demand Asserts a Right.
 - A **motion** asks the court to exercise *discretion* in granting relief.
 - A demand asserts an existing legal right that must be acknowledged and enforced.
- 100. Plaintiff's Demand for Summary Judgment is *a Matter of Law*, Not Judicial Discretion
 - Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court "shall" grant summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute of material fact. The word "shall" is mandatory, not discretionary.
 - California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(c) likewise states: "The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
 - This establishes that the Court does not have the discretion to deny or delay judgment where Defendants have failed to contest the material facts.
- 101. Failure to Act on a Demand is Judicial Nonperformance and a Due Process <u>Violation</u>.
 - Plaintiff has filed undisputed, sworn affidavits establishing their claims.

5

8

10

11

12

13

1415

16

17

18

19 20

21

23

2.4

24

2526

27

28

- Defendants have failed to rebut, respond, or oppose, thereby conceding by tacit acquiescence.
- Judicial failure to rule on a demand where no genuine dispute exists is an obstruction of justice and a due process violation under 28 U.S.C. § 1361.

Unrebutted Affidavits are 'prima facie' evidence:

verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H), Exhibits E, F, G, and H are prima facie evidence of fraud, racketeering, indentity theft, treason, breach of trust and fiduciary duties, extortion, coercion, deprivation of rights under the color of law, conspiracy to deprive of rights under the color of law, monopolization of trade and commerce, forced peonage, obstruction of enforcement, extortion of a national/internationally protected person, false imprisonment, torture, creating trusts in restraint of trade dereliction of fiduciary duties, bank fraud, breach of trust, treason, tax evasion, bad faith actions, dishonor, injury and damage to Affiant and Plaintiff proof of claim. See *United States v. Kis*, 658 F.2d, 526 (7th Cir. 1981)., "Appellee had the burden of first proving its prima facie case and could do so by affidavit or other evidence."

<u>Unlawful and Unconstitutional Detainment and Arrest while</u> <u>'Traveling' in Private Automobile:</u>

103. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendants in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H):

1. On December 31, 2024, at approximately 9:32am, Kevin: Walker, sui juris, was traveling privately in my private automobile, displaying a 'PRIVATE' plate, indicating I was 'not for hire' or operating commercially, and the private automobile was not displaying a STATE plate of any sort. This clearly established that the private automobile was 'not for hire' or

property, and NOT within any statutory and/or commercial jurisdiction. A

copy of the PRIVATE 'not for hire' or 'commercial' use is attached hereto as

'commercial' use and, therefore explicitly classifying the automobile as private

1

67

8

10

11 12

1314

15

16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

2425

26

27

28

Exhibits O and incorporated herein by reference.

2. Upon unlawfully stopping and detaining the private traveler (Kevin: Walker), Defendants, including Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, conspired on the scene in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. Photographs of Defendants, Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, and William Pratt, are attached hereto as Exhibits O, P, and Q

respectively, and incorporated by reference herein.

- 3. All Defendants on the scene at that time, including Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, were NOTICED that the traveler is a state Citizen, non-citizen national/national/internationally protected person, privately traveling in a private automobile, as articulated by the traveler, and as evidenced by the 'PRIVATE' plate on the private automobile.
- 4. The <u>private</u> automobile and <u>trust property</u> was **not** in *any* way displaying STATE or government registration or stickers, and was displaying a PRIVATE plate, removing the automobile from the Defendant's jurisdiction. See Exhibit N.
- 5. The <u>private</u> automobile is duly reflected on Private UCC Contract Trust/ **UCC1 filing** NOTICE #2024385925-4 and UCC3 filing and NOTICE #2024402990-2 (Exhibits C and D).
- 6. Under threat, duress, and coercion, and at gunpoint, the private traveler (Kevin: Walker) presented Defendants Gregory D Eastwood and Robert C V Bowman national/non-citizen national, #C35510079 and passport book #A39235161. Copy attached hereto as Exhibits O and P respectively, and incorporated herein by reference.

- 1 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 7
- 8
- 10
- 11
- 1213
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 2425
- 26
- 27
- 28

- 7. Defendant(s), acted against the Constitution, even when explicitly reminded of their duties to support and uphold the Constitution.
- 8. At no point in time were Defendants presented with a CALIFORNIA DRIVER'S LICENSE (COMMERCIAL CONTRACT), and any information added to the CITATION/CONTRACT was done so in fraud, without consent, full disclosure, and thus is *void ab initio*.
- 9. The private traveler and national (Kevin: Walker), should never have been stopped exercising his **inherent** and *unalienable* **right** to travel, in a <u>private</u> automobile that was clearly marked "PRIVATE" and "not for hire" and "not for commercial use.

Fraudulent Alteration of Signature, Coercion, Assault, Torture, Kidnapping:

- 104. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendants in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H)
 - 1. After being kidnapped, handcuffed, tortured, and deprived of rights and livery under the color of law, the private traveler national/internationally protected person(Kevin: Walker), Defendant Robert Gell threatened to "house" the national if he did not sign every document presented, exactly as he (Robert Gell) wanted the national to. Camera records will evidence Robert telling the national return to the release tank for no apparent reason, and then assaulting, shoving, and pushing the national/internationally protected person into the tank at the end of the walk.
 - 2. Defendant Robert Gell went as far as aggressively rushing around a desk and assaulting Kevin, and snatching a pen from hiss hand, simply because the attempted to write 'under duress' by his signature.
 - 3. Defendant Robert Gell willfully and intentionally altered Affiant's signature on one document and crossed out 'UCC 1-308,' immediately after Affiant hand wrote it on the document.

Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA — Registered Mail #RF775824950US — Dated: April 17, 2025

4. Defendant Robert Gell stated he had no idea what an attorney-in-fact is and that Kevin: Walker was a, ["]jackass["] for stating that such a thing exists, evidencing Gell's incompetence.

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine:

- 105. Plaintiff further asserts and establishes again on the record that the undisputedly unlawful and unconstitutional stop, arrest, and subsequent actions of the Defendants/Respondents are in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the united States of America and constitute an unlawful arrest and seizure. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, as articulated by the <u>U.S. Supreme Court</u>, establishes that <u>any</u> evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful stop or detainment is tainted and inadmissible in <u>any</u> subsequent proceedings. The unlawful actions of Gregory D. Eastwood, Robert C. V. Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, and Robert Gell including *but not limited to* the issuance of fraudulent citations/contracts under threat, duress, and coercion, render all actions and evidence derived therefrom <u>void ab initio</u>. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
- 106. Plaintiff therefore declares and demands that all actions and evidence obtained in connection with this unlawful stop be deemed inadmissible and void as fruits of the poisonous tree.
- 107. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendants in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and self-executing contract security agreements (Exhibits E, F, G, and H).

Use defines classification:

1. It is **well established law** that the **highways** of the state **are public property**, and **their primary and preferred use is for <u>private</u> purposes**, and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit." **Stephenson vs. Rinford**, 287 US 251; **Pachard**

vs Banton, 264 US 140, and cases cited; Frost and F. Trucking Co. vs.

City Forwarding Co., 57 SW.2d 290; Parlett Cooperative vs. Tidewater

Railroad Commission, 271 US 592; Railroad commission vs. Inter-

5

8

9

7

10

11 12

13 14

15

16

17 18

19

20

2122

23

25

26

27

28

Lines, 164 A. 313
The California Motor Vehicle Code, section 260: Private cars/vans etc. not in commerce / for profit, are immune to registration fees:

(a) A "commercial vehicle" is a vehicle of a type REQUIRED to be REGISTERED under this code".

- (b) "Passenger vehicles which are **not used** for the transportation of persons **for hire**, compensation or profit, and housecars, **are not commercial vehicles**".
- (c) "a vanpool vehicle is not a commercial vehicle."
- 3. <u>18 U.S. Code § 31 Definition</u>, expressly stipulates, "The term "motor vehicle" means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power <u>and</u> used for <u>commercial</u> purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo".
- 4. A vehicle not used for **commercial** activity is a "consumer goods", ...it is **NOT** a type of vehicle **required** to be registered and "use tax" paid of which the tab is evidence of receipt of the tax." Bank of Boston vs Jones, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021, 236 A2d 484, UCC PP 9-109.14.
- 5. "The 'privilege' of using the streets and highways by the operation thereon of motor carriers <u>for hire</u> can be acquired only by permission or license from the state or its political subdivision. "—Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed, page 830.
- 6. "It is held that a tax upon common carriers by motor vehicles is based upon a reasonable classification, and does not involve any unconstitutional discrimination, although it does not apply to private vehicles, or those

used by the owner in his own business, and not for hire." Desser v. Wichita,

(1915) 96 Kan. 820; Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v. Railroad Comrs., 75 A.L.R.

1

22.

6

4

9

11

13

12

1415

1617

18

1920

21

22

23

2425

26

2728

7. "Thus self-driven vehicles are classified according to the use to which they are put rather than according to the means by which they are propelled." Ex Parte Hoffert, 148 NW 20.8. In view of this rule a statutory provision that the supervising officials

- "may" exempt such persons when the transportation is not on a commercial basis means that they "must" exempt them." State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; 60 C.J.S. section 94 page 581.
- 9. "The use to which an item is put, rather than its physical characteristics, determine whether it should be classified as ``consumer goods'' under UCC 9-109(1) or ``equipment'' under UCC 9-109(2)." Grimes v Massey Ferguson, Inc., 23 UCC Rep Serv 655; 355 So.2d 338 (Ala., 1978).
- 10. "Under UCC 9-109 there is a real distinction between goods purchased for personal use and those purchased for business use. The two are mutually exclusive and the **principal use to which the property is put should be considered as determinative.**" **James Talcott, Inc. v Gee,** 5 UCC Rep Serv 1028; 266 Cal.App.2d 384, 72 Cal.Rptr. 168 (1968).
- 11. "The classification of goods in UCC 9-109 are mutually exclusive."
 McFadden v Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 8 UCC Rep Serv 766;
 260 Md 601, 273 A.2d 198 (1971).
- 12. "The classification of ``goods" under [UCC] 9-109 is a question of fact."

 Morgan County Feeders, Inc. v McCormick, 18 UCC Rep Serv 2d 632; 836

 P.2d 1051 (Colo. App., 1992).
- 13. "The definition of ``goods'' includes an automobile." Henson v Government Employees Finance & Industrial Loan Corp., 15 UCC Rep Serv 1137; 257 Ark 273, 516 S.W.2d 1 (1974).

14. "No State government entity has the power to allow or deny passage on the highways, byways, nor waterways... transporting his vehicles and personal property for either recreation or business, but by being subject only to local regulation i.e., safety, caution, traffic lights, speed limits, etc. Travel is not a privilege requiring, licensing, vehicle registration, or forced insurances." *Chicago Coach Co.* v. *City of Chicago*, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22.

The RIGHT to Travel is not a Privilege:

- 15. The fundamental Right to travel is NOT a Privilege, it's a gift granted by your Creator and restated by our founding fathers as Unalienable and cannot be taken by any Man / Government made Law or color of law known as a <u>private</u> "Code" (secret) or a "Statute."
- 16. "Traveling is passing from place to place--act of performing journey; and traveler is person who travels." In Re Archy (1858), 9 C. 47.
- 17. "Right of transit through each state, with every species of property known to constitution of United States, and recognized by that paramount law, is secured by that instrument to each citizen, and does not depend upon uncertain and changeable ground of mere comity."

 In Re Archy (1858), 9 C. 47.
- 18. Freedom to **travel** is, indeed, an important aspect of the citizen's "liberty". We are first concerned with the extent, if any, to which Congress has authorized its curtailment. (Road) **Kent v. Dulles**, 357 U.S. 116, 127.
- 19. The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. So much is conceded by the solicitor general. In Anglo Saxon law that right was emerging at least as early as Magna Carta. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125.
- 20. "Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his

business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with

public interest and convenience. Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337

Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22, 206.

21."... It is now universally recognized that the state does possess such power [to impose such burdens and limitations upon private carriers when using the public highways for the transaction of their business] with respect to common carriers using the public highways for the transaction of their business in the transportation of persons or property for hire. That rule is stated as follows by the **supreme court of the United States**: 'A citizen may have, under the fourteenth amendment, the **right** to travel and transport his property upon them (the public highways) by **auto vehicle**, but **he has no right to make the highways his place of business by using them as a common carrier for hire**. Such use is a privilege which may be granted or withheld by the state in its discretion, without violating either the due process clause or the equal protection clause.' (*Buck v. Kuykendall*, 267 U. S. 307 [38 A. L. R. 286, 69 L. Ed. 623, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324].

22. "The right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business differs radically an obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for private gain, in the running of a stage coach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of a citizen, a right common to all; while the latter is special, unusual and extraordinary. As to the former, the extent of legislative power is that of regulation; but as to the latter its power is broader; the right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and denied to others, because of its extraordinary nature. This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all the authorities."

- 23. "Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his/her property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience." ["regulated" means traffic safety enforcement, stop lights, signs etc.]—Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 22.
- 24. "The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime." Miller v. U.S., 230 F 2d 486, 489.
- 25. "There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional rights." —Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 945.
- 26. The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus."—State vs. City of Spokane, 186 P. 864.
- 27. "The right of the citizen to **travel** upon the public highways and to transport his/her property thereon either by carriage or automobile, is **not** a mere privilege which a city [or State] may prohibit or permit at will, but a common right which he/she has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." —Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579.
- 28."The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common right which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose

Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784.

of life and business." — Thompson vs. Smith, supra.; Teche Lines vs.

- 29. "The use of the highways for the purpose of **travel** and transportation is not a mere **privilege**, but a common and fundamental **Right** of which the public and the individual cannot be rightfully deprived."—Chicago Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22;Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE 934;Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607;25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways Sect.163.
- 30. "The right to b is part of the Liberty of which a citizen cannot deprived without due process of law under the <u>Fifth Amendment</u>. This Right was emerging as early as the Magna Carta." <u>Kent vs. Dulles</u>, 357 US 116 (1958).
- 31. "The state **cannot** diminish Rights of the people." <u>Hurtado vs. California</u>, 110 US 516.
- 32. "Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion to go where and when one pleases only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct." —II Am.Jur. (1st) Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135.
- 33. Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

34. "The state **cannot** diminish **Rights** of the **people."** —Hurtado vs. California, 110 US 516.

NO QUALIFIED OR LIMITED IMMUNITY

- 35. "When enforcing mere statutes, judges of all courts do not act judicially (and thus are not protected by "qualified" or "limited immunity," SEE:

 Owen v. City, 445 U.S. 662; Bothke v. Terry, 713 F2d 1404) - "but merely act as an extension as an agent for the involved agency -- but only in a "ministerial" and not a "discretionary capacity..." Thompson v. Smith, 154

 S.E. 579, 583; Keller v. P.E., 261 US 428; F.R.C. v. G.E., 281, U.S. 464.
- 36. "Public officials are not immune from suit when they transcend their lawful authority by invading constitutional rights." AFLCIO v. Woodward, 406 F2d 137 t.
- 37. "Immunity **fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility** while liability promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the government to its people." (Civil Rights) **Rabon vs Rowen Memorial Hospital, Inc.** 269 N.S. 1, 13, 152 SE 1 d 485, 493.
- 38. "Judges not only can be sued over their official acts, but could be held liable for injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney's fees."

 Lezama v. Justice Court, A025829.
- 39. "Ignorance of the law does not excuse misconduct in anyone, least of all in a sworn officer of the law." **In re McCowan** (1917), 177 C. 93, 170 P. 1100.
- 40. "All are presumed to know the law." San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel (1882), 62 C. 641; Dore v. Southern Pacific Co. (1912), 163 C. 182, 124 P. 817; People v. Flanagan (1924), 65 C.A. 268, 223 P. 1014; Lincoln v. Superior Court (1928), 95 C.A. 35, 271 P. 1107; San Francisco Realty Co. v. Linnard (1929), 98 C.A. 33, 276 P. 368.
- 41. "It is one of the fundamental maxims of the common law that ignorance of the law excuses no one." **Daniels v. Dean** (1905), 2 C.A. 421, 84 P. 332.